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Introduction
The Main Three Contamination Monitoring Cart (M3) is an assembly of three different
types of real-time contamination sensors packaged into an integrated, portable, user-friendly
system.   Previous methods of monitoring were real-time only if personnel could gain access to
them for observation or for data download from them.  The operational constraints of the pay-
load processing environment minimized their real-time ability.  The M3 system augments these
technically advanced sensorsÕ abilities by bringing the data from the payload location to the user
for truly real-time assessment and corrective action.  This is very important for highly sensitive
payloads in an environment that is, by nature, difficult to control from a contamination stand-
point.  These technological and operational advances in molecular and particulate contamina-
tion monitoring will enhance our access to space as new spacecraft materials and functions
necessitate better cleanroom controls in the launch environment.
Dynacs Engineering built the M3 under the technical guidance of civil service employees
to be used by NASA/KSC Payloads Contamination Control Engineering.
History
Before real-time contamination monitoring sensors proved their accuracy and overall
benefits in the payload-processing domain, lab analysis methods alone were employed to
assess the molecular and particulate fallout contamination levels of cleanrooms.  Real-time
measurement of cleanroom temperature, relative humidity, and airborne particle counts was
already available.  However, particle fallout, non-volatile residue (surface deposition of molecu-
lar contaminants), and airborne hydrocarbons were still being monitored by the use of fallout
filters/silicon wafers, witness plates, and evacuated canisters, respectively, that were then taken
to the lab for analysis.  These methods are still used as comparison and backup data to sensors
since they are reliable, and are, in-fact, the only methods used during a standard non-sensitive
processing flow.  However the amount of information that can be acquired from the data from
these methods is limited.  The data shows an incomplete picture of what the payload has been
exposed to with little opportunity to take any preventative action during a contamination incident.
These standards were used in the process of validating the data obtained from the real-time
sensors during their developmental phases.
The sensors were developed individually with the intention of bringing real-time, accu-
rate data representing the molecular and particulate signature of the room to the user.  Efforts to
reduce human error, transportation discrepancies, and uncertainties in the complex nature of
contamination deposition and migration brought these sensors into the spotlight.  Although the
equipment collected and logged data real-time, prior to the M3 cart the data was not always
easily accessible in a payload-processing or launch environment.  The sensors had to be linked
to a computer for the user to see the data.  This configuration was not usually allowed to be left
unattended given the hazardous classification of processing facilities or the sensitive nature of
the payload.  However, providing a person to keep watch over the data 24 hours a day in the
locale of the sensors was not always practical or feasible.  Occasions during which users may
find most need for the sensors (highest threat of contamination) were sometimes the very
occasions that observers could not be present, for safety reasons, to monitor their data.  There-
fore, the capability for real-time data was there, but the data was not easily accessible.
With the Main Three Cart, the data from the three types of sensors are integrated into a
single software package that runs on the cart controller computer. Here, the data is logged in a
disk file and presented to the user in several forms, including tabular and graphical.  The user
can opt to view any or all of the cart measurements.  The cart controller software was written in
Microsoft Visual Basic (Ref. 1).
All of the data from the cart is put into a single data stream and sent via a serial link to a
remote computer that can be located in another building.  Here, the data is presented in the
same way as on the cart controller computer, so the user at the remote site sees exactly the
same data in real time.  This remote system is also configured as a user datagram protocol
(UDP) server and, if connected to a local area network (LAN) that supports Internet Protocol,
can broadcast the cart data in real time to many remote users simultaneously anywhere in the
world.  These very remote users can see the same screens as the local users, but can select
their own options for which data to view. The user can then choose to view the data from each
instrument in tabular or graphical formats.  The user can also change x and y scales on the axis.
The software provides online chat between all connected users.  The data sent to the userÕs
computer is logged into files that can be imported into a spreadsheet.
The server can be configured to selectively allow certain domains to access the informa-
tion so that the availability of the data can be restricted based on prior authorization.  This is the
same technology that is used for ÒInternet broadcastsÓ of video and audio.  To view the data
from anywhere in the world, all that is required is the UDP client software (also written in Visual
Basic) and a PC compatible with an Internet connection and authorization on the UDP server to
allow the user to connect (Ref. 2).
Three Types of Sensors and How They Work
The Main Three Contamination Monitoring Cart includes three types of sensors: Fourier
Transform Infrared (FTIR) for monitoring airborne hydrocarbons, Surface Acoustic Wave (SAW)
non-volatile residue (NVR) monitors, and Optical Fallout Monitors (OFM) for detecting particle
fallout.
The FTIR technology, with its inherent ability to discriminate a large number of com-
pounds, offers a tremendous advantage over other types of instrumentation.  Commonly used
hydrocarbon monitoring instrumentation, such as flame ionization detectors, yields no informa-
tion about the source or identity of the compounds they detect. The hydrocarbon monitoring
subsystem of the M3 consists of two modified MIDAC FTIR instruments; a computer providing
control, user interface, and communications; and a sampling system.  The graphical user inter-
face runs on the cart controller computer, which has a keyboard, mouse, and monitor.  The
hydrocarbon portion of the cart is capable of measuring a variety of compounds and can be
reconfigured to accommodate new compounds of interest.  The MIDAC instruments were
modified by the addition of a small computer inside the instrument case that controls the opera-
tion of the FTIR and provides deconvolution of spectral data.  Each FTIR module sends gas
concentration data to the cart controller computer, is equipped with a 1.8-meter gas cell, and
runs at a resolution of 4 wavenumbers.  The sampling system consists of two eductor pumps
supplied by the system purge gas.  There are also flow failure indicators that are monitored by
the cart controller computer.  The FTIR module makes use of a classical least square (CLS)
algorithm in the analysis of spectral data.  The traditional CLS method has been modified by the
use of baseline correction algorithms, which correct errors due to instrument warm-up, aging of
the source, and degradation of the optics due to contamination.  This correction is accomplished
by performing a parametric shape fit for the baseline using three parameters: bend, tilt, and
offset (Ref. 1).
The FTIRÕs are currently capable of measuring eleven compounds simultaneously out
of the following compounds:
Methanol Ethanol IPA Freon 113 Methylene chloride
Acetone Methane Hexane Propane Benzene
Toluene Acetic acid MEK Ethylene Glycol Ethyl Ether
Methyl Silicone Vinyl chloride Styrene Ethyl benzene
Total Hydrocarbons DM Pentane
DM Butane
The NVR detection instrument is based upon a temperature controlled Surface Acoustic
Wave (TCSAW) crystal device, built by Femtometrics, Inc.  This device consists of two small
quartz crystals, one exposed to the environment and the other sealed (called the Òreference
crystalÓ).  Both are mounted on a common substrate and are connected to an electronics pack-
age that provides circuitry to mix the frequencies of the two crystals and derive a difference
frequency that is output to a frequency counter.  The quartz crystals themselves are overlaid
with interdigitated metallic fingers at a spacing which defines the wavelength of the transverse
surface acoustic waves which travel back and forth along its length. The increase in mass due
to the residue deposition on the crystal causes a shift in the resonant frequency of the crystal,
which then can be used to quantify the residue mass.  The SAW devices of the M3 consist of a
control unit inside the purged cart and a sensor head with an exposed quartz crystal. The SAW
is extremely sensitive, roughly 100 times the sensitivity of a Quartz Crystal Microbalance.  A 50-
hertz shift in the frequency of the SAW crystal corresponds to only 1 nanogram per square
centimeter mass density (Ref. 3).
The OFM is based on light scattered from particles deposited on a silicon witness sur-
face.  The scattered light is collected by optics and focused on a detector.  The signal at the
detector is proportional to the Percent Area Coverage (PAC) of the witness surface.  The instru-
ment is designed so that the silicon witness surface can be removed and scanned in an Estek“
surface scanner. This device has been tested by several commercial companies, field tested at
KSC, and licensed non-exclusively for production and commercial sales by two different compa-
nies (Ref. 4).
Safety Issues
One of the greatest hurdles to operating the M3 in Kennedy Space Center facilities was
ensuring its safe operation while unattended.  Since the M3 started out as a prototype ammonia
monitoring unit, the basic GN2-purged cabinet containing the two FTIR modules and computer
was validated by Safety and Reliability Assurance and received a full System Assurance Analy-
sis.  However, the modifications to the basic cart required a reassessment of the system safety
for several reasons.
Areas where the M3 is used may often be a Class I Division 2 hazardous environment.
A Class I, Division 2 location is a location in which flammable fluids are used but in which the
fluids are normally confined but can escape accidentally, or in which ignitable concentrations of
such fluids are normally prevented but might become hazardous through failure of ventilation
equipment.  A purged and pressurized enclosure for electrical equipment is considered a suit-
able protection technique for Class I, Division 2 environments. However, on the M3, some of the
electronics are now exterior to the purged cabinet, including the OFM and SAW sensors and
associated cables.  Therefore, per the National Electric Code, the next reasonable option was to
make the exterior equipment intrinsically safe per ANSI/UL-913.
The OFM was submitted for evaluation to the NASA Materials Science Division Analysis
Lab to determine if it met intrinsically safe requirements per ANSI/UL-913.  The monitor meets
NEC Class I requirements as indicated in paragraphs 501-3, (b) (1) and 501-3, (b) (2) and
complies with UL-913 paragraphs 7.1.2-6 as an intrinsically safe device.  For added precaution,
a Zener barrier was incorporated on the power supply.  In addition, the system housing was
tested for electro-static discharge characteristics.  As a result, the original plastic housing was
replaced with an aluminum version.
The SAW assessment was more complicated since it is built by Femtometrics and some
useful information is proprietary.  Testing for intrinsic safety is ongoing.  If the SAW does not
meet the NEC and UL-913 specifications, these sensors alone would be turned off during active
fueling activities.  This can be done from the remote primary computer.  The SAW temperature
controllers (Peltier Coolers) were disabled as they were seen as a potential spark hazard.
Operationally, the cart power can be terminated using a switch on the door or remotely
from the serial-linked computer.  The power also terminates if the purge pressure in the cart is
lost, whether from the front or rear door of the cart opening or from purge supply disturbance.
The weight and center of gravity of the cart significantly changed as well.  A tip-over
analysis and proofloading of the lifting eyes was performed at KSC.
Conclusion
The Main Three Contamination Monitoring technology shows great promise in bringing
us closer to optimum cleanroom processing of payloads at KSC.  This advance in real-time
monitoring is a developmental gain toward the successful implementation of contamination-
sensitive missions.
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